The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, Electronic Health Records, And The Challenge Of Electronic Discovery by Byrne, Terrance K
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Journal of Law and Health Law Journals
2015
The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, Electronic
Health Records, And The Challenge Of Electronic
Discovery
Terrance K Byrne
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Perspective is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of Law and Health by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Terrance K Byrne, The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, Electronic Health Records, And The Challenge Of Electronic Discovery, 28 J.L. &
Health 379 (2015)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh/vol28/iss2/9
 
 
 
379 
 
 
 
 
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS, AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
TERRANCE K BYRNE 
 I.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 379 
 II.  THE WORLD OF DISCOVERY ................................................ 382 
 III.  SPOLIATION ......................................................................... 385 
 IV.  ZUBULAKE V. UBS WARBURG, L.L.C. ................................ 387 
 V.  UPDATING THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ....... 389 
 VI.  “MEET AND CONFER” REQUIREMENT UNDER RULE 26(F) ... 390 
 VII.  KNOWN OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN STANDARD .................. 393 
 VIII.  PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION ...................... 395 
 IX.  SANCTIONS FOR SPOLIATION ............................................... 400 
 X.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 404 
 
[E]lectronic discovery is suddenly upon us. It became ubiquitous and 
essential very quickly. Although intuitively we think of the ability to 
gather, retrieve, and search vast amounts of information remotely and 
electronically as the source of great savings in time, effort, and money, so 
far the reverse has proven true. Electronic discovery is more expensive, 
more time-consuming, more difficult, and more anxiety producing than 
paper discovery.1  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Picture the not so distant future of healthcare: 
Mary, a forty-two year old mother of three, was having chest pain.  Her physician 
ordered a chest x-ray.  He saw a “hazy area,” and ordered a Computerized 
Tomography (CT) scan of her chest.  The procedure was completed with no mention 
of any abnormality.  A year later, Mary went back to her physician because she 
found a lump in her breast.  She was diagnosed with cancer that had spread to her 
lungs.  After several months of aggressive, but unsuccessful treatment, Mary was 
moved to hospice and died.  Her husband hired an attorney who requested all 
medical records and all diagnostic images, including shadow or unused CT exam 
slices, as well as audit trails from all systems that housed Mary’s electronic records, 
including audits showing which practitioners reviewed her CT scan and results. 
                                                          
 1 Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal & James C. Francis IV, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views 
from the Judges, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (2007).  
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Jim worked at the local plant for forty-two years.  Jim was a meat and potatoes 
guy, who had a sedentary lifestyle and was overweight.  Jim started having chest 
pain and was taken to the emergency room, where the doctors there found that his 
heart was enlarged.  He was taken to surgery for a cardiac catheterization and 
placement of a stent.  After the procedure, his heartbeat was irregular.  Because of 
this, he was admitted to the hospital again.  He was placed in the cardiac unit with 
continuous telemetry monitoring so that his doctors and nurses could more easily 
monitor his heart rhythm at a central desk.  In the middle of one night, a Code Blue 
is called on Jim, because his heart had stopped.  Despite the quick work of the 
doctors and nurses, Jim did not survive.  Six months later, an attorney representing 
Jim’s family requested his medical records including all of the continuous 
monitoring data for the time that Jim was in the cardiac unit.  The attorney also 
requests all of the images from the catheterization lab and the time sheets of all staff. 
Rita was an eighty-three year old mother of two, grandmother of four, and great 
grandmother of one.  Rita had been a widow for years, and had continued to live on 
her own.  She was active and in reasonably good health.  One day she noticed she 
had shortness of breath and went to see her doctor.  After taking a chest x-ray, he 
diagnosed her with pneumonia.  She was admitted to the hospital for antibiotic 
therapy.  Because of Rita’s age, diagnoses, and medications, she was considered 
“high risk” for falls.  Accordingly, special precautions had to be taken.  Her daughter 
talked with the nurses and physician and made sure Rita was comfortable.  Later that 
night, Rita got up to go to the bathroom. On her way back to bed she tripped and fell, 
fracturing her hip.  For the next six months Rita was confined to a wheelchair.  She 
had move to an extended care facility.  Rita’s family sued.  Their attorney requested 
Rita’s entire medical record, the hospital’s policy on “high risk” falls, an audit of her 
bed alarm, an audit of all nurse calls for the floor, and any instructions given to 
patients and families regarding falls. 
While these stories are all hypothetical, similar accidents happen in hospitals on a 
routine basis, some of which are preventable.2  Litigation often follows.  With the 
advent of electronic health records (“EHRs”) and electronic monitoring tools, the 
risks that hospitals face regarding the storage and production of electronically 
recorded data have increased, and will continue to increase. 
Widespread adoption of EHRs3 spurred by the Health Information Technology 
for Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH”),4 combined with recent advances 
in electronic monitoring and recording of patient data, will continue to change the 
nature of healthcare litigation.5  Long battles over electronic discovery (“e-
                                                          
 2 See LINDA T. KRON, JANET CORRIGAN & MOLLA S. DONALDSON, TO ERR IS HUMAN: 
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Mike Edington et al. eds., 2000).  
 3 See Chun-Ju Hsaio & Esther Hing, Use and Characteristics of Electronic Health 
Record Systems Among Office Based Physician Practices: United States, 2001—2013, U.S 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTIONN NAT’L CTR. 
FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 1, 1 (Jan. 2014), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db143.pdf.  
 4 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115. 
 5 See Blake Carter, Electronic Medical Records: A Prescription for Increased Medical 
Malpractice Liability, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 389 (2010).  
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discovery”) have already begun.  Archetypal cases such as Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg6 (“Zubulake I”) and Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. The William Morris 
Agency7 illustrate the serious financial implications of e-discovery.8 
Before the recent change to EHR, medical records were paper documents.9 When 
a legal dispute arose, the record was secured.10  When healthcare litigation began, 
specifically in the area of medical malpractice, the plaintiff’s attorney would request 
the “complete medical record,” which included all physician orders, progress notes, 
nursing documentation, and results of any testing.11 
What constituted a complete legal medical record could be clearly defined.  
Health care providers, with some direction from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
services (CMS) and the Joint Commission (JC), outlined what was to be included in 
the complete legal medical record.12  The daily list of tasks needed for the patient 
care, reams of monitoring strips, the ubiquitous sticky notes left on the front of the 
chart to remind the physician to reorder the patient’s antibiotics, and such similar 
items were routinely discarded in the usual course of business.13 
The advent of electronically stored records has caused a tremendous increase in 
the volume, type, and location of information that become part of a patient's 
treatment history.14  At the same time, recent amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), specifically relating to electronically stored information 
(“ESI”),15 have broadened the definition of “legal medical record.”   The 
combination has markedly increased the challenges and risks of litigation.16 
 
                                                          
 6 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 7 Rowe Entm’t v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
 8 Id. at 423, 431-433. 
 9  See Sandeep S. Mangalmurti et al., Medical Malpractice Liability in the Age of 
Electronic Health Records, NEW ENG. J. MED. 2060, 2061 (Nov. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMhle1005210.  
 10 See id. at 2060.  
 11 See e.g., Fundamentals of the Legal Health Record and Designated Record Set, 
AMERICAN HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_048604.hcsp?dDocNam
e=bok1_048604.  
 12 WILLIAM K. MCLENDON, THE LEGAL HEALTH RECORD: REGULATIONS, POLICIES AND 
GUIDELINES 83-84 (Michael R. Lowe, ed., 2nd ed. 2011). 
 13 Id. at 14-15.  
 14 See id. at 10.  
 15 See id. at 67-70 (recognizing and broadening the need to retain emails, text messages, 
video, audio, etc).  
 16  See id. at 42, 64.  
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In an era of electronic health records, these and other issues will have to be 
addressed. Disparities among different courts’ interpretations of the FRCP 
amendments have caused confusion for those in law and healthcare.18  Additional 
amendments to the FRCP are necessary to provide clarity, especially in  the area of 
healthcare electronic discovery.  Specifically, future amendments should include: 
1. Enforcing the “Meet and Confer” process, especially as related to e-
discovery and ESI; 
2. Clear specification about when the duty to preserve information begins; 
3. Delineating reasonable and consistent standards for production of 
information; and  
4.Outlining the details for when sanctions for failing to retain ESI are 
appropriate. 
II. THE WORLD OF DISCOVERY 
As a guiding principle, Rule 1 states that the Rules are to be “construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.”19   Under that premise, the purpose of discovery is not 
intended to be a tool for one party to gain a strategic advantage over its adversary.20 
Rule 26(b)(2) of the Rules specifically details the scope and limits of the civil 
discovery process.21 Generally, and unless otherwise limited by the court, “[p]arties 
                                                          
 17 Hsaio & Hing, supra note 3 at 1. 
 18 See e.g., The Legal Health Record in the Age of Discovery, Healthcare Information and 
Management Systems Society (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.himss.org/files/himssorg/content/files/legalhealthrecord.pdf.  
 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 
 20  See Igbinovia v. Catholic Healthcare West, No. 2:07-CV-01170, 2010 WL 507881 
(D.Nev. Dec. 7, 2010) (unreported case).   
 21 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).   
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may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense.”22  
The scope of discovery is intended to be quite broad.23 As expansive as a process 
that discovery may be, it is not intended to be without bounds.  Indeed, the Rules 
provide clear grounds for the court to justifiably interfere with the discovery 
process.24 The dramatic rise in the pervasiveness of EHRs, while improving 
outcomes and ensuring better accuracy for patient treatment, has concurrently 
complicated the discovery process when litigation is required to resolve a dispute.25 
Discovery is an integral component of the litigation process.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines it as: 
1. The act or process of finding or learning something that was previously 
unknown . . . . 2. Compulsory disclosure, at a party’s request, of 
information that relates to the litigation . . . . 3. The facts or documents 
disclosed . . . . 4. The pretrial phase of a lawsuit during which depositions, 
interrogatories, and other forms of discovery are conducted.26  
 
The FRCP delineate what evidence is to be shared during discovery.27  Rule 26 
details what kind of information must be shared between parties during discovery: 
(a) Required Disclosures. 
(1) Initial Disclosure.  
(A) In General. Except as exempted by Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or as otherwise 
stipulated or ordered by the court, a party must, without awaiting a 
discovery request, provide to the other parties: 
(i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each 
individual likely to have discoverable information--along with the 
subjects of that information--that the disclosing party may use to support 
its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment; 
                                                          
 22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).   
 23 See e.g. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“No longer can the time-honored 
cry of ‘fishing expedition serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his 
opponent’s case.”). 
 24  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (empowering district court to order discovery of any 
relevant matter); see Hickman 329 U.S. at 507 (“But discovery, like all matters of procedure, 
has ultimate and necessary boundaries.”). 
 25 Hickman 329 U.S. at 507 (1947).  
 26 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (10th ed. 2014); see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. & 
MICHELLE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION 115 (1993): 
Discovery has a broad scope.  According to Federal Rule 26, which is the model in 
modern procedural codes, inquiry may be made into any matter, not privileged, that is 
relevant to the subject matter of the action.’  Thus, discovery may be had of facts 
incidentally relevant to the issues in the pleadings even if the facts do not directly 
prove or disprove the facts in question. 
 27 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
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(ii) a copy--or a description by category and location--of all documents, 
electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing 
party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its 
claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment; 
(iii) a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing 
party--who must also make available for inspection and copying as under 
Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, unless privileged or 
protected from disclosure, on which each computation is based, including 
materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(iv) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34, any insurance 
agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all 
or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse 
for payments made to satisfy the judgment.28 
 
At least forty-four states have adopted similar statutes and court rules to address 
discovery of ESI in state proceedings.29  The purpose of discovery is clear:  Each 
party during discovery shares essential information that allows them to more 
efficiently prepare, present, and perhaps defend its case. While the discovery rules 
generally permit discovery of all relevant information, and the while the Supreme 
Court has construed the rule liberally,30 there is a prohibition on discovery of 
privileged information or information otherwise protected by attorney client 
privilege or, in healthcare, peer review protection.31 
Considering this rule more precisely in the context of healthcare unearths an 
initial and significant question: What kind of information must be kept?  Discussing 
this question in the context of antitrust litigation, one judge stated in her order:  
Documents, data, and tangible things” shall be interpreted broadly to 
include writings, records, files, correspondence, reports, memoranda, 
calendars, diaries, minutes, electronic messages, voice mail, E-mail, 
telephone message records or logs, computer and network activity logs, 
hard drives, backup data, removable computer storage media such as 
tapes, discs and cards, printouts, document image files, Web pages, 
databases, spreadsheets, software, books, ledgers, journals, orders, 
invoices, bills, vouchers, check statements, worksheets, summaries, 
compilations, computations, charts, diagrams, graphic presentations, 
drawings, films, charts, digital or chemical process photographs, video, 
phonographic, tape or digital recordings or transcripts thereof, drafts, 
jottings and notes, studies or drafts of studies or other similar such 
material. Information that serves to identify, locate, or link such material, 
                                                          
 28 Id. 
 29 Current Listing of States That Have Enacted E-Discovery Rules, K&L GATES, 
http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/state-district-court-rules/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).  
 30 Hickman 329 U.S. at 507 (1947).  
 31 Scope and extent of protection from disclosure of medical peer review proceedings 
relating to claim in medical malpractice action, 69 A.L.R.5th 559 
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such as file inventories, file folders, indices, and metadata, is also 
included in this definition.32 
This seems to be at odds with the rule found in what many courts regard as the 
leading case in e-discovery: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg  (“Zubulake I”).  In Zubulake 
I, despite chastising defendants for failing to retain substantive backup tapes, the 
court opined, “[m]ust a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of litigation, 
preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic document, and every 
backup tape? The answer is clearly, ‘no.’33  Such a requirement would surely cripple 
large corporations.”34  Despite various amendments35 to the FRCP and the 
correlating state rules, the persisting lack of clarity from either the FRCP itself or the 
Supreme Court tacitly permits courts to vary in their rulings about the kinds of 
information need to be kept, or that may instead, be appropriate to destroy.  This lack 
of clarity has lead to significant confusion for parties to a lawsuit.36 
III. SPOLIATION 
During discovery a party may realize that information it seeks is no longer 
available.  This loss of information may occur in the usual course of business, or 
may implicate a purposeful deprivation of information to which the other party is 
entitled. In these cases, a court must determine the intention behind the destruction 
as well as the availability of other potentially supplemental resources.  If the 
information is intentionally destroyed, the court may need to address whether 
“spoliation” has occurred. 
Spoliation generally refers to “[t]he intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, 
or concealment of evidence.”37  The Sedona Conference (“TSC”),38 a non-profit 
organization involved in in research and development of law and policy, regularly 
publishes and updates its Glossary for E-Discovery and Digital Information 
Management.39  The general definition of spoliation may be more relevantly 
                                                          
 32 In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., C-07-00086, 2008 WL 1831668 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
22, 2008). 
 33 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on 
Experience, 60 Duke L.J. 597 (2010). 
 36 A Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (2009), available at 
http://www3.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/jlm/toc/. 
 37 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1620 (10th ed. 2014). 
 38 “The mission of TSC is to drive the reasoned and just advancement of law and policy by 
stimulating dialogue amongst leaders of the bench and bar to achieve consensus on tipping 
point issues . . . . [with the] goal of creating practical solutions and recommendations of 
immediate benefit to the bench and bar.” THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, 
https://thesedonaconference.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
 39 The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Working Group Series, May 2005 
Version, available at https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/3757. 
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expanded to include:  “[T]he destruction of records or properties, such as metadata,40 
that may be relevant to ongoing or anticipated litigation, government investigation or 
audit.”41 “Spoliation is the destruction of records which “[c]ourts [have]may be 
relevant to ongoing or anticipated litigation, government investigation or audit.  
Courts differ[ed] in their interpretation of the level of intent required before 
sanctions may be warranted.”42 
Rule 37 of the FRCP outlines a court’s role in determining what steps can be 
taken against parties that do not participate or collaborate during the discovery 
process.43  In 2006, Rule 37(e)44 was specifically added to address electronic data. 45 
As the Committee Notes to the amendment state:  
[The Rule] focuses on a distinctive feature of computer operations, the 
routine alteration and deletion of information that attends ordinary use. 
Many steps essential to computer operation may alter or destroy 
information, for reasons that have nothing to do with how that 
information might relate to litigation. As a result, the ordinary operation 
of computer systems creates a risk that a party may lose potentially 
discoverable information without culpable conduct on its part. Under Rule 
37(e), absent exceptional circumstances, sanctions cannot be imposed for 
loss of electronically stored information resulting from the routine, good-
faith operation of an electronic information system.46 
 
The Committee Notes for the 2006 amendment to Rule 37 also discuss “good 
faith” more specifically:  
Whether good faith would call for steps to prevent the loss of information 
on sources that the party believes are not reasonably accessible under 
Rule 26(b)(2) depends on the circumstances of each case. One factor is 
whether the party reasonably believes that the information on such 
sources is likely to be discoverable and not available from reasonably 
accessible sources.47 
                                                          
 40 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1141 (10th ed. 2014) (“Secondary data that organize, 
manage, and facilitate the use and understanding of primary data.  Metadata are evaluated 
when conducting and responding to electronic discovery.”). 
 41 The Sedona Conference, supra note 39. 
 42 Glossary, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY REFERENCE MODEL, 
http://www.edrm.net/resources/glossaries/glossary/s/spoliation, (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 43 FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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Many state courts have adopted this position or one similar to it, though each 
state rule can vary.48  Courts have also shown significant variation in evaluating 
evidence loss or destruction as well as imposition of any sanctions in the event of 
spoliation.49  This variation has lead to inconsistent and contradictory court rulings.50 
In Spoliation of Evidence and Medical Malpractice, Dr. Anthony Casamassima 
discussed possible remedies to be applied in cases of spoliation: 
Three policy reasons exist justifying the control of spoliation of evidence: 
promotion of truth-seeking, fairness, and preservation of the integrity of 
the judicial system. There are three corresponding purposes for remedial 
measures in response to spoliation: restoration of accuracy, compensation 
of the victim of spoliation, and punishment of the spoliator. In turn, the 
aim of punishment may be retribution against the spoliator or deterrence 
of spoilage conduct. The purpose of restoration of accuracy is closely tied 
to the policy of promoting truth-seeking; the compensation purpose 
parallels the fairness policy; and the punitive aspect may prevent further 
incursions upon judicial integrity.51 
 
Discretion then is given to the court to determine the sanctions that will be 
applied.52 This discretion has lent itself to a wide variation in the application of the 
rule.53 
IV. ZUBULAKE V. UBS WARBURG, L.L.C. 
Prior to the 2006 amendments to the FRCP, Zubulake provided an insightful 
framework for addressing e-discovery.54 The case55 analyzed when the duty to 
preserve begins, whether electronic records are discoverable, and the circumstances 
in which data is accessible.56  That case also discussed appropriate sanctions for 
failing to preserve evidence after the duty to preserve has attached.57 
Rule 26(b)(2) imposes limitations on the discovery process with regard to ESI.  
The 2006 amendment to the rule was a specific attempt to standardize the discovery 
                                                          
 48 Seymour Moskowitz, Discovery in State Civil Procedure: The National Perspective, 35 
W. ST. U. L. REV. 121, 124-25 (2007). 
 49  Eric M. Larsson, Causes of Action 2d 1 Causes of Action for Spoliation of Evidence 
(Mar. 2015).  
 50 Id. 
 51 Anthony C. Casamassima, Spoliation of Evidence and Medical Malpractice, 14 PACE L. 
REV. 235, 239-40 (1994). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 William P. Barnette, Ghost in the Machine: Zubulake Revisited and Other Emerging E-
Discovery Issues Under the Amended Federal Rules, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 17 (2012). 
 55 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C., 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 56 See Barnette, supra note 54, at 17. 
 57 Id. 
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process with regard to ESI.58 Subsection B specifically contemplates limitations on 
the production of ESI: 
A part need not provide discovery of electronically stored information 
from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because 
of undue burden or cost.  On motion to compel discovery or for a 
protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that 
the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or 
cost.  If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery 
from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering 
the limitations Rule 26(b)(2)(C).  The court may nonetheless specify 
conditions for discovery.59 
 
While “[t]here is a presumption that the responding party must bear the expense 
of complying with discovery requests,” the responding party may invoke the court’s 
discretion under Rule 26(c) for an order to protect it from “undue burden or expense 
in complying” with the request.60   
In Zubulake, the plaintiff was dismissed from her job as an equity sales person at 
UBS Warburg.61  She filed her original complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that she was specifically targeted 
because she was a woman.62  Her claim alleged that she was wrongfully 
discharged.63  During the protracted discovery period, Zubulake asked the court to 
order UBS to produce all relevant emails and to do so it its own expense.64   
During discovery, it was determined that UBS had destroyed some of the backup 
tapes containing responsive emails.65 The court recognized however, that only if 
UBS had a duty to retain the information could such a loss be properly considered 
spoliation.66  In light of this decision, a question remained regarding the appropriate 
point in time that UBS should have known it was required to retain the information. 
In answering this question the court clarified that, “[t]he duty to preserve 
attached at the time that litigation was reasonably anticipated.”67  Because plaintiff 
                                                          
 58 See Vlad Vainberg, When Should Discovery Come With a Bill?  Assessing Cost Shifting 
for Electronic Discovery, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1523, 1556 (2010) (“There is one key difference 
between . . . Zubulake and Rule (26)(b)(2).  Zubulake conditioned the findings of whether 
production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive . . . primarily on whether it is 
kept in an accessible or inaccessible format.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 59 Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 60 Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 170,71 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
 61 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 312. 
 62 Id. at 313. 
 63 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D; Id. at 309. 
 64 Id. at 312. 
 65 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C., 220 F.R.D. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 66 Id. at 216. 
 67 Id. at 217 (emphasis added). 
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Zubulake filed her lawsuit in August 2001, the court determined that UBS 
reasonably should have anticipated the litigation in April 2001.68  The court 
subsequently penalized UBS, requiring it to pay for re-deposition of several key 
witnesses.69  Such action thus set a new standard for cases involving e-discovery.70  
The framework created in Zubulake, although not binding, has nonetheless has been 
adopted by several other courts.71 
V. UPDATING THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
After the Zubulake rulings, it became apparent that the FRCP, as well as related 
state rules, had not adequately addressed ESI in the context of discovery.  In May 
2005, the FRCP Advisory Committee72 introduced several changes to the Rules to 
better address ESI73 that became effective in December 2006:74  
1. Early attention to Electronic Discovery Issues: Rule 16, 26(a), 26(f) and 
Form 35 
2. Discovery into Electronically Stored Information that is Not Reasonably 
Accessible: Rule 26 (b) (2). 
3. Procedure for Asserting Claims of Privilege and Work Product Protection 
after Production:  Rule 26(b)(5) 
4. Interrogatories and Requests for Production Involving Electronically Stored 
Information: Rules 33, 34(a) and (b) 
                                                          
58 Id. 
 69 Id. at 222. 
 70 See id. at 217. 
 71 See e.g. Automated Solutions Corp. v. Paragon Data Sys., Inc., 756 F.3d 504, 514-15 
(6th Cir. 2014); Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (D.CFed. Cir. 2011); 
John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008); Lindsay v. Clear Wireless L.L.C., Civil 
No.13-834, 2014 WL 813875 (D.Minn. Mar. 3, 2014) (citing applicability of Zubulake factors 
in context of inaccessible ESI) (unreported case); Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Intern., 285 
F.R.D. 331, 336 (E.D.Pa. 2012) (“Many reported decision apply standards for requiring that 
the requesting party share discovery costs. Recently most of these cases involve ESI. The 
leading opinion is undoubtedly Judge Scheindlin’s Zubulake.”); W Holding Co. v. Chartis Ins. 
Co. of Puerto Rico, 293 F.R.D. 68, 73 (D.P.R. 2013) (discussing application of Zubulake); 
Helmert v. Butterball, L.L.C., No.4:08-CV-00342, 2010 WL 2179180 (E.D.Ar. 2010) 
(applying Zubulake) (unreported case); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 
No. 9:08-CV-143, 2009 WL 440543 (E.D.Tex. 2009) (analysis based on Zubulake) 
(unreported case); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 636 (D.Kan. 2006) 
(“Zubulake is the leading case on “cost-shifting of electronic discovery.”). 
 72 “The Supreme Court first established a rules advisory committee in June 1935 to help 
draft the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect in 1938. Today, Advisory 
Committees . . . carry on a continuous study of the rules and recommend changes to the 
Judicial Conference through a Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.” 
Committee Membership Selection, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-
policies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection (last visited Sept. 9, 
2015). 
 73 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1).   
 74 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (effective Dec. 1, 2006).  
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5. Sanctions for Certain Types of Loss of Electronically Stored Information75 
 
While the amendments were responsive to some of the issues with which courts 
have struggled, and that Zubulake explicitly addressed,76 the amendments have 
nevertheless failed to provide sufficient guidance. 
VI. “MEET AND CONFER” REQUIREMENT UNDER RULE 26(F) 
The goal of the drafters of Rule 16, 26(a) and 26(f) was to have litigants and 
courts discuss issues regarding discovery material in a timely fashion to avoid 
confusion and concerns with the confidentiality (or privilege), integrity, and 
availability of information relevant to the case.77  Specifically, 26(f) requires the 
parties to “meet and confer”78 about specific discovery issues:79   
There are three primary changes in the Amended Rule. First, the parties 
are required to discuss the issue of preservation of potentially relevant 
records. This obligation applies not only to ESI [electronically stored 
information] but also to all “documents” as that term is defined within the 
Federal Rules. This is the first time the obligation to discuss and address 
preservation has ever been expressly set forth in the Federal Rules. 
Second, the parties are required to discuss the disclosure of ESI and, 
specifically, the format production of ESI. Finally, the parties are required 
to discuss the issue of privilege in the context of inadvertently produced 
documents.80 
 
In the conference notes to the 2006 amendments, the committee noted: 
When a case involves discovery of electronically stored information, the 
issues to be addressed during the Rule 26(f) conference depend on the 
nature and extent of the contemplated discovery and of the parties' 
information systems. It may be important for the parties to discuss those 
systems, and accordingly important for counsel to become familiar with 
those systems before the conference. With that information, the parties 
can develop a discovery plan that takes into account the capabilities of 
their computer systems. In appropriate cases identification of, and early 
discovery from, individuals with special knowledge of a party's computer 
systems may be helpful.81 
                                                          
 75 LEGALPUB.COM INC., THE NEW E-DISCOVERY RULES (Dahlstrom Legal Publishing 
2006).  
 76 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C., 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 77 See LEGALPUB.COM INC., supra note 75 at 11.  
 78 Moze Cowper & John Rosenthal, Not Your Mother's Rule 26(f) Conference Anymore, 8 
SEDONA CONF. J. 261, 263 (2007).  
 79 Id. at 261. 
 80 Id. at 261, 262.  
 81 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
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The meet and confer process, although seemingly straightforward, nevertheless 
continues to present difficulties to litigants. In Love v. Permanente Medical Group,82 
the plaintiff brought an action against her employer for wrongful termination and 
retaliation.83  The judge offered a sharp rebuke of the parties as she issued a 
discovery order:  
During the course of the hearing, the court repeatedly noted the failure of 
the parties to engage in meaningful meet and confer sessions and 
cooperative discovery practice. The parties were directed to review the 
Northern District of California “Guidelines for the Discovery of 
Electronically Stored Information” and “Checklist for Rule 26(f) Meet 
and Confer Regarding ESI.” In light of the record in this case, the court 
orders that all further meet and confer sessions, including those required 
by this order, must include a discussion about specific sources and search 
protocols (including search terms, if applicable) before any search is 
conducted.84 
 
The court in Mikron v. Hurd Windows also recognized the purpose of the “meet 
and confer” requirement.85 That case involved a contract dispute.86  In light of the 
extensive discovery, the defendants sought to shift some of the costs of searching 
their electronic files to the plaintiffs.87 The court denied defendant’s motion to shift 
costs, finding that the parties did not meet their obligation to meet and confer in 
good faith.88  The court chastised the litigants, stating that the purpose of the Rule 26 
meeting was not just for their benefit, but also to better ensure that the court’s 
resources were not wasted, “to ensure that only genuine disagreements are brought 
before the Court.”89 
Courts may impose sanctions if parties do not follow the meet and confer rule. In 
Laserdynamics v. Asus Computer,90 the court addressed counsel’s failure to adhere to 
the rules: 
                                                          
 82 Love v. Permanente Medical Group, 2013 WL 6056657, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 
2013). 
 83  Id. at *1. 
 84  Id. at *4. 
 85 Id. at *1 (referring to the “meet and confer” requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) 
because the motion was for a protective order).   
 86 Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., 2007 WL 3033933, at * 1 (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 12, 2007). 
 87 Id.  
 88 See Mikron, 2008 WL 1805727, at * 1. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Asus Computer Int’l, 2009 WL 153161 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 
2009). 
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Prior to the claim construction hearing in this case, the parties filed eight 
discovery motions. That conduct is indicative of the manner in which this 
case has proceeded since before the initial scheduling conference. Most, if 
not all, of these motions should not have been necessary, and these 
disputes are indicative of a reckless disregard of the discovery obligations 
and the rules of practice applicable in this court. This order resolves the 
discovery disputes and imposes sanctions on the Asus defendants for the 
reasons expressed herein.91 
 
A parallel example of such conduct the context of medical malpractice was seen 
in Hernandez ex rel. Telles-Hernandez v. Sutter Medical Center.92  There, the 
plaintiffs sued for neurological and developmental problems related to complications 
that occurred during childbirth.93  After the hospital and a physician settled, the 
government was the remaining defendant in the case.94  The court found that the 
government delayed and failed to meet and confer in good faith with the opposing 
party.95  In denying the government’s motion for partial summary judgment, the 
court emphasized: 
All parties are expected to meet and confer before filing any motion 
before this court.  This requirement is mandatory. It requires a reasonable 
and good faith effort by the parties to meet and confer and resolve their 
differences, prior to using the resources of this Court and its authority to 
resolve their dispute. This rule has many benefits and is supported by a 
number of positive public policies. In particular, it streamlines litigation, 
allows the parties and the Court to use their time and resources more 
efficiently, and often facilitates settlement. More importantly, until the 
parties meet and confer, they do not know whether they have a genuine 
dispute to bring before the Court, tying up its scarce resources. In many 
cases, it will obviate the need for a motion, altogether. As such, the 
requirement is not a mere formality. Nor is it a duty the parties may take 
lightly.96 
 
The courts require parties to follow “meet and confer” requirements, both federal 
and local, to discuss issues related to discoverable information in a case.97  
                                                          
 91 Id. at *1.  
 92 No. C 06–03350, 2008 WL 2156987, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2008). The U.S. 
Government was also a party to the case because Plaintiff brought a claim under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. Id.    
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. at *1, *3-4 (explaining that in “2007, the Court approved a stipulation to substitute 
the government for Dr. Steele, because when he treated Hernandez, he was acting under a 
program funded under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975”).  
 95 See Id. at *1.   
 96 Id. at 6.  
 97 Id.  
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Therefore, the “meet and confer” process raises issues as to what information is 
relevant, and more importantly, when the duty to preserve information begins.  
VII. KNOWN OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN STANDARD  
One issue in discovery is determining when the duty to preserve information 
begins.98  Though some courts have held that the duty exists when the providing 
party has been put on notice that the information needs to be preserved,99 the court in 
Zubulake went further, stating, in essence, that the duty may exist when a party 
“should have known” that litigation was anticipated. 100 
The duty of preservation clearly starts if a party anticipates further litigation.101  
In Innis Arden v. Pitney Bowes, the plaintiff, Innis Arden Golf Club (“Innis Arden”), 
found polychlorinated biphenyls on its property.102  It engaged a company to do soil 
analysis in the hopes of determining where the source of contamination came 
from.103  Innis Arden’s intent was to determine the source of contamination and then 
engage in discussions about remediation and recovery costs.104 
During discovery it was determined that Innis Arden had not informed the 
contractor hired to perform the soil analysis to preserve the soil samples and data 
that it had acquired.105 The soil samples were destroyed as part of the normal 
business practices.106  In addition, the computer analysis of the data had become 
corrupted and was also not available.107 
The court noted, “Innis Arden not only did not perform all the tests that it 
believed to be relevant before the samples were destroyed, it precluded Pitney 
Bowes [a neighboring company that Innis Arden sued as the alleged source of the 
contamination] from running potentially exculpatory tests by failing to preserve this 
material.”108  In addition, the court noted that the duty to preserve began with the 
collection of the soil samples, as Innis Arden “recognized from the beginning that 
the analysis of soil samples was the key evidence in this case”109 
This concept of “knew or should have known” presents a new standard.110  In 
healthcare, when can one “reasonably anticipate” litigation? Negative outcomes are 
                                                          
 98 See e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).   
 99 See Kronish v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998); Zubulake v. USB 
Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).   
 100 Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216. 
 101 See Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 334, 339 (D. Conn. 2009). 
 102 See id. at 335. 
 103 See id. at 335-36. 
 104 See id. 
 105 Id. at 338. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 334, 338 (D. Conn. 2009). 
 108 Id. at 341. 
 109 Id. at 340. 
 110 Compare Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
duty to preserve evidence begins when a party should have known the evidence may be 
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often a foreseeable result of illness or injury, even when care is properly rendered.  
Physicians, especially surgeons, will advise patients of the “Risks, benefits, and 
alternatives” as part of the informed consent process prior to a procedure.111 
Clearly if a patient suffers a “Never Event,” as defined by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, litigation may ensue.112  But, how then would peer 
review cases be handled? In the introductory cases, would one assume that all 
occurrences triggering similar events would qualify as “foreseeable litigation,” for 
which all data collected should be preserved.113 
A recent case illustrates the difficulty parties face in determining if evidence 
should be kept.114  In Martinez v. Abbott Labs, the plaintiff filed an appeal of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.115  The patient, Martinez, had surgery 
and postoperatively had a patient controlled analgesia (PCA) pump with 
morphine.116  According to the medical records, the patient appeared to receive an 
overdose of morphine, which made her unresponsive.117  Martinez sued the hospital 
and the pump manufacturer; however, the trial court granted both defendants’ 
motions for summary judgment.118  Martinez filed an appeal,119 that the trial court 
permitted “peer review privilege” which hindered her capacity to adequately present 
her case.120  Interestingly, in analyzing the peer review privilege, the appellate court 
addressed whether the hospital had a duty to preserve the pump.121  The court stated 
that the hospital “had no duty to isolate or download information from the PCA 
pump because nothing about the circumstances surrounding the incident would have 
put [it] on notice that there was a substantial chance Martinez would pursue a 
claim.”122  Despite the court documents and depositions that a Risk Management 
Committee and a Quality Review Committee both reviewed the case, the court still 
did not feel there was a need to maintain the pump information.123  The court did not 
                                                          
relevant to future litigation), with Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the duty to preserve evidence begins when a party is on notice 
that litigation is likely to be commenced). 
 111 See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OPINION 8.08 – INFORMED CONSENT (2006), 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics/opinion808.page? 
 112 See Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 4247 (2012). 
 113 See Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216. 
 114 Martinez v. Abbott Labs, 146 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 115 Id. at 263. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 264. 
 119 Id. at 263. 
 120 Martinez v. Abbott Labs, 146 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 121 Id. at 270. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 267. 
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address the concern that the hospital should have known that legal action might have 
occurred and should have at least kept the log of the PCA pump.124 
In National Tank Co. v. 30th Judicial District Court, the court recognized the 
difficulty in determining when the duty to preserve information begins, especially 
when a company has performed an investigation.125  In this action, the court 
reviewed, “whether accident reports and witness statements prepared by relator and 
its insurer following a plant explosion are privileged from discovery.”126  The court 
commented, “[t]he fundamental problem that has plagued other courts is determining 
whether a “routine” investigation is conducted in anticipation of litigation.”127  The 
court identified several cases, both for and against all accident investigations giving 
rise to the belief that litigation may be pending.128  In summarizing, the court left the 
standard open ended, stating that information should be kept if: 
an investigation is conducted in anticipation of litigation for purposes of 
Rule 166b(3) when a) a reasonable person would have concluded from the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation that there was a 
substantial chance that litigation would ensue; and b) the party resisting 
discovery believed in good faith that there was a substantial chance that 
litigation would ensue and conducted the investigation for the purpose of 
preparing for such litigation.129 
 
 
Once the question of when the duty to preserve information occurs is answered, 
then the question becomes one of whether responsive information exists.130  If 
responsive information does exist, how will it be produced? 
VIII. PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 
One of the other difficult rules to arbitrate between parties is the format in which 
the documents or information will be produced.131  Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure covers the production of documents during discovery.132  
                                                          
 124 See generally Martinez,146 S.W.3d at 260-272. 
 125 Nat’l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 206 (Tex. 1993).  
 126 Id. at 195. 
 127 Id. at 205. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 207. 
 130 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & Erisa Litig., 762 F. Supp. 2d 942, 965 (S.D. Tex. 
2010). 
 131 Gavin Foggo et al., Comparing E-Discovery in the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and Mexico, MCMILLAN LLP (Aug. 2007), available at 
http://www.mcmillan.ca/Files/BHarrison_ComparingE-Discoveryintheunitedstates.pdf.  
 132 FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
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Unfortunately, the rule is somewhat contradictory and lends itself to interpretation 
by both the parties and the courts.133  
Rule 34(b)(1)(C) states that parties “may specify the form or forms in which 
electronically stored information is to be produced.”134  Rule 34(b)(2)(D) allows the 
responding party to object to a form of production, and to state the form that it will 
produce the information.135  Rule 34 (b)(2)(E) complicates that matter further by 
stating: 
Producing the Documents or Electronically Stored Information. Unless 
otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, these procedures apply to 
producing documents or electronically stored information: 
(i)A party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of 
business or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories 
in the request; 
(ii)If a request does not specify a form for producing electronically stored 
information, a party must produce it in a form or forms in which it is 
ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms . . .136 
 
In Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, “shareholders of publicly listed target 
companies brought an action claiming that private equity firms illegally colluded in 
their purchase of target companies as part of leveraged buyouts (LBO) in violation of 
antitrust laws.”137  As discovery began, plaintiffs filed a motion objecting to a 
request by the defendant to produce documents in a specified format.138  The court 
agreed with the plaintiff, reading the rule as only requiring a party to produce 
information as it normally kept it in the course of doing business.139 
In Waste Mgmt. of Texas, Inc., a competitor of a waste removal company filed an 
antitrust lawsuit.140  Several rounds of discovery requests ensued, with the trial court 
outlining that the production of documents should be in a reasonable format.141  
Waste Management subsequently submitted 25 gigabytes of documents in PDF 
format.142  Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the electronic documents in native 
format with metadata.143  Waste Management cited the plaintiffs’ third request, 
                                                          
 133 See e.g. Joshua Gilliland, Adventures in Statutory Construction of FRCP Rule 
34(b)(2)(E), BOW TIE LAW’S BLOG (Nov. 20, 2011), 
https://bowtielaw.wordpress.com/2011/11/20/adventures-in-statutory-construction-of-frcp-
rule-34b2e/. (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).  
 134 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(C). 
 135 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(D). 
 136 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E). 
 137 Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, L.L.C., 655 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 138 Id. at 149-50. 
 139 Id. at 149. 
 140 In re Waste Mgt. of Texas, Inc., 392 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App. 2013). 
 141 Id. at 865. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
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which asked for, “[a]ny and all data or information which is in electronic or 
magnetic form should be produced in a reasonable manner.”144  Regardless, the 
court, in siding with the defendants illustrated this point: 
A request for reasonably useable or a reasonable manner is sufficient. It 
provides some flexibility to the producing party. For example, a request 
for.docx file format used by Microsoft Word 2010 might require some 
producing parties to purchase the specific software requested and expend 
resources converting files to the requested format. On the other hand, if 
the request was simply for a “reasonably useable” electronic discovery, 
the producing party could produce files in Word Perfect X4 format 
instead. Communication between the parties is essential, and, if a party 
feels a request is too ambiguous, that party should contact the opposing 
side. A small amount of ambiguity, though, does not give the producing 
party carte blanche to do whatever it wants. 145 
 
The court, in United States of America ex rel. John Becker, provided a thorough 
review of why the defendant was required to produce documents in native format 
with metadata, as opposed to the TIFF and OCR images already produced.146 
Metadata associated with properly preserved and produced native 
documents is more accurate than metadata associated with TIFFs. A 
Native document includes all of its metadata within it. When Native 
documents are converted from Native to TIFF format, all of the 
metadata associated with them is lost in the conversion process. To 
partially remedy this metadata loss, some metadata fields from the 
original Native documents are extracted and provided as part of the load 
file accompanying the TIFF productions. Unfortunately, most of the 
hundreds of metadata elements that can be obtained from a Native 
document are not provided as part of the load file in a TIFF-based 
production.147 
 
However, production in the agreed upon format may not protect a party from 
having to produce it again in a different format.148  In City of Colton v. Am. 
Promotional Events, Inc., cities brought action against owners of the property 
formerly used as United States Army ammunition storage facility, seeking cleanup 
costs.149  The United States objected to the court ordered production of responsive 
documents in their native format, as opposed to the TIFF images produced.150  
                                                          
 144 Id. at 875. 
 145 Id. at 874. 
 146 United States v. Tools & Metals, Inc., 2010 WL 1476043 *1 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
 147 Id. at *2.  
 148 Id. at *13. 
 149 City of Colton v. Am. Promotional Events, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 578, 580 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 150 Id. at 585. 
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Plaintiffs argued that they followed the original order of the special master assigned 
to the case.151 Defendants argued that “Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i) required the United States 
either (1) to produce documents, including ESI, as they are kept in the usual course 
of business or (2) to organize and label the production to correspond to the 
Production Requests.”152 
In its response, the Court separated production from organization.153 It clarified, 
despite the government’s argument, that documents produced in electronic format 
must still be submitted in an organized fashion.154  The court further noted: 
Unless and until the parties agree to amend their production protocol to 
include metadata fields sufficient to satisfy the requirement under Rule 
34(b)(2)(E)(i) that documents, including ESI, be produced as they are 
kept in the usual course of business, the Rules require the United States 
(and Defendants) to organize and label their productions to correspond to 
the categories in the request.155 
 
The production from electronic health records will be particularly vexing.156  As 
commented in Once Byten, Twice Shy: Preservation and Production of Electronic 
Health Records, Jennifer Albert notes: 
An EHR system is a database of electronic health records, but that 
description is somewhat deceptive. When users view a patient's electronic 
health record, they are not viewing a discrete document, but a report 
generated by a database query and built of select fields of information 
culled from a complex dataset. It is then presented in a user-friendly 
arrangement determined by the EHR system's client capabilities and user 
settings. Therefore, the EHR report the user sees on a screen may “feel” 
like a traditional document, but it is drawn from different sources within 
the database that are constantly subject to change.157 
Albert goes further and states, “Paper production, such as a paper printout of 
what the EHR system user views as a patient's medical record, is not sufficient 
because electronic medical records contain data relevant to the litigation that is not 
readily apparent from a paper printout.”158 
                                                          
 151 Id. at 580. 
 152 Id. at 582 
 153 Id. at 585-86. 
 154 Id. at 584. 
 155 City of Colton v. Am. Promotional Events, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 578, 585-86 (C.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 156 See Jennifer A. Albert, Once Byten, Twice Shy: Preservation and Production of 
Electronic Healthcare Records, 32 REV. LITIG. 395, 423 (2013) (“The nature of HER 
databases presents unique challenges to the healthcare lawyer designing an effective legal 
hold.”)  
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 424. 
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A view of the difficulties Northshore University Health System experienced 
illustrates the current transitory nature of healthcare record production.159  
Northshore University Health System was sued by a patient for negligence.160  
During the discovery phase, the plaintiff requested a copy of the entire medical 
record.161  The only option available to Northshore was to use the “print screen” 
function to print individual pages.162  After production, the court granted a motion 
for the plaintiff to review the system in person, as well as a copy of the system that 
could be reviewed later.163  Even after all of that, the plaintiff remained concerned 
that all the patient’s health information may not have been provided.164 
Not all electronic data continues to be available, or it is in an unreadable format 
that cannot be accessed without special software.  In a study called Using IV Infusion 
Pump Electronic Memory for Retrospective Drug Utilization Reviews,165 the authors 
note that the data from the pump is available utilizing specialized software.166  
However, information was not uploaded to the EHR, and lacked information on the 
operator or patient.167  Concern exists regarding practitioners’ reliance on the new 
“smartpumps.”168  The inability to determine who accessed and selected the 
medication and to verify that the correct patient information was used will present 
issues.169 
In the examination of a malpractice case, Smith and Berlin outline a particular 
issue that perplexed the defendant hospital.170 The plaintiff’s wife sued the hospital 
and radiologists after a perceived delay in diagnosis of the decedent’s abdominal 
aortic aneurysm.171  During discovery it was determined that the images of the CT 
scan stored in the picture archiving and communication system (PACS) were never 
                                                          
 159 See generally Chris Dimick, EHRs Prove a Difficult Witness in Court, J. AM. HEALTH 
INFO. MGMT. ASS’N (Sept. 24, 2010), http://journal.ahima.org/2010/09/24/ehrs-difficult-
witness-in-court/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Kathy A. Tran, et al., Using IV Infusion Pump Electronic Memory for Retrospective 
Drug Utilization Reviews, 187 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. A5327 (2013).  
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Smart pumps have built in drug dictionaries and protocol that the operator selects when 
giving the medication.  This assists in preventing programing errors.  INST. FOR SAFE MED. 
PRACTICES, PCA Drug Libraries:  Designing, Implementing, and Analyzing CQI Reports to 
Optimize Patient Safety, available at 
http://www.ismp.org/profdevelopment/PCADrugLibrariesforwebce.pdf. 
 169  Id. at 6. 
 170 John J. Smith and Leonard Berlin, Picture Archiving and Communication Systems and 
the Loss of Patient Examination Records, 176 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 1381, 1381-84 (2001).  
 171 Id. at 1381. 
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saved.172 After an expert review and a search of the database, the study was found 
under a different patient name and identifier.173   
This illustrates that the “how, when, and where” ESI is stored is becoming more 
of an issue and introduces questions about the repercussions of failing to protect or 
produce evidence.   
IX. SANCTIONS FOR SPOLIATION 
Several cases illustrate the different directions and views the courts have 
regarding sanctions for spoliation.  In Sweet v Sisters of Providence Washington,174 
the trial court did not issue a spoliation claim despite the loss of the patient’s medical 
records.175  The patient, an infant, was born, circumcised, discharged, and returned 
several days later because of a blood infection caused by the circumcision.176  The 
patient was admitted to the hospital and subsequently began having seizures.177  The 
patient suffered brain damage due to a lack of oxygen.178 The parents (Sweets) sued 
the hospital and physicians. 179 
During discovery, it was determined that many parts of the medical record were 
missing.180  The trial court “shifted the burden of proof to the hospital (Providence) 
on the issues of its duty and breach on the Sweets' medical negligence claim.”181 
However, the court refused to shift the burden of proof as to causation.182  The 
burden remained on the Sweets to establish that medical negligence was the legal 
cause of [the infant’s] injuries.”183  The appellate court disagreed and remanded the 
case for review of the issue.184 
In Rodman v. Ardsley Radiology, P.C., the plaintiffs sought a spoliation claim 
against the radiologist and the radiology group for loss of a mammogram film.185  
The patient had been to the clinic for regular mammograms during the course of 
several years, including 2003 and 2004.186  In 2004, the plaintiff was diagnosed with 
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breast cancer and underwent breast surgery, chemotherapy, and other treatment.187  
The plaintiff requested the 2003 mammogram to take to her surgeon to evaluate. 188 
The radiology group had recently moved and could not find the film; in fact, the film 
was never found even after the lawsuit and discovery ensued.189 
The plaintiffs sued for negligence, citing the misread of the 2003 
mammogram.190  In addition, they asked the court to issue sanctions for the willful 
destruction of evidence.191  The trial court denied the spoliation claim asserting that 
there was no evidence of willful action on the defendants’ part and that the film 
appeared to have been lost before the lawsuit commenced.192 
On appeal the court disagreed.193  The court found that Rodman had not proved, 
despite the testimony of experts, that the missing film was pertinent to her claim.194  
In making its decision, the court noted: 
The record indicates that the film was missing early on in November 
2004, well before this litigation was commenced in June of 2005. There is 
no proof in the record that the film was lost after the defendants were 
placed on notice that the film might be needed for future litigation. 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs have failed to establish in their motion papers 
through their expert witness that the 2003 film is crucial to proving their 
case. While plaintiffs' expert mentions in his affidavit that he could not 
review the November 18, 2003 right breast mammography film because it 
was reportedly missing, he does not comment on its significance. He 
makes no attempt to show that the missing film is critical to the case or 
that the plaintiffs are prejudiced in any way by the film's loss or 
destruction.195 
 
Thus the court weighed two factors to determine appropriate sanctions: was the 
loss deliberate and what effect did that loss have on the case at hand.196 
In Carmelina Baglio, v. St. John Queen Hospital,197 the court denied the motion 
by the plaintiff to strike the defendant’s answers to discovery.198  In this medical 
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negligence case, the defendants lost the fetal monitoring strips of the infant’s birth.199  
The trial court took the unusual stance stating: 
[W]hile the fetal monitoring strips are clearly significant to plaintiff's 
case, there is other evidence that is available. Indeed, plaintiff's medical 
records and progress notes are included in the case file. Thus, the court 
cannot conclude that the loss of the strips prejudices plaintiff as to warrant 
the drastic sanction of striking St. John's answer.200 
 
The appellate court firmly disagreed: 
[W]e agree with the plaintiffs that the Hospital's negligent loss of the fetal 
monitoring strips warrants striking its answer. The plaintiffs' evidence 
demonstrated that “[t]he fetal monitoring strips are the most critical 
evidence to determine fetal well-being at the time of treatment, and in 
evaluating the conduct of health care providers with regard to obstetrical 
management thereafter.” Further, under the facts of this case, the fetal 
monitoring strips would give fairly conclusive evidence as to the presence 
or absence of fetal distress, and their loss deprives the plaintiff of the 
means of proving her medical malpractice claim against the Hospital. 201 
 
In contrast, the trial court in Gotto v. Eusebe-Carter202 struck the defendant’s 
hospital answer for loss of fetal monitoring strips.203  On appeal, the court noted: 
The plaintiff did not clearly establish that the Hospital negligently lost or 
intentionally destroyed the fetal heart monitoring data for July 19, 1997, 
the date of Ryan's birth. The record fails to rule out the possibility that the 
central monitoring computer system utilized by the Hospital in its labor 
and delivery unit to electronically store fetal heart data onto an optical 
disk was properly operating, or the possibility that it malfunctioned on 
July 19, 1997, due to no fault of any of the parties involved in this action, 
and resulting in no fetal heart data being recorded or stored for that 
date.204 
 
Thus, the plaintiff did not prove that the loss hindered her ability to try the case, 
even though the defendant did not account for the loss of the fetal monitoring 
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strips.205  The appellate court then directed an adverse inference instruction against 
the hospital.206 
In Innis Arden v. Pitney Bowes, mentioned above, the court emphasized the need 
to preserve evidence.207  The fact that Innis Arden allowed, or at the very least did 
not stop, the destruction of the soil samples was reckless.208  In its decision, the court 
noted that, “a severe sanction nevertheless is necessary, because overlooking the 
failure to preserve this evidence would have the effect of condoning this broad 
disregard for the need to retain raw scientific-sampling evidence and might not deter 
similar conduct in future” actions.209 
In Keene V. Brigham Hospitals,210 the court recommended sanctions as a legal 
remedy available.211  The case involved an infant that became septic several hours 
after birth, and now suffers from severe neurological deficit.212  During the course of 
litigation, it was determined that the hospital had lost the several hours of 
documentation about the care of the infant that would have explained the treatment 
and who was involved.213  The appellate court was asked to review several rulings of 
the trial court, specifically, if a “default judgment on liability was properly entered as 
a sanction for the defendant's failure to produce in discovery relevant hospital 
records that it admittedly had lost.”214  The court noted in its ruling:  
The parties and the judge considered the situation as one arising under 
rule 37(b)(2)(C), which authorizes a judge, when confronted with a party 
who fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, to “make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others ... [a]n order 
striking out pleadings or parts thereof ... or rendering a judgment by 
default against the disobedient party.” In view of the judge's 
determination that the defendant was unable (as opposed to unwilling) to 
produce the documents, this was not correct. Requests for discovery 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 34(a), 365 Mass. 792 (1974), require 
production of documents that “are in the possession, custody or control of 
the party upon whom the request is served.” By these express terms, rule 
34(a) does not demand production of documents that “were in” or that 
“should have been kept in” the party's possession. Put simply, there can 
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be no discovery violation, and hence no rule 37 sanction, when a party 
fails to produce documents it does not possess.  (emphasis added)215 
The court went on to add: 
In retrospect, the matter should have been disposed of under the doctrine 
of spoliation, which permits the imposition of sanctions and remedies for 
the destruction of evidence in civil litigation. The doctrine is based on the 
premise that a party who has negligently or intentionally lost or destroyed 
evidence known to be relevant for an upcoming legal proceeding should 
be held accountable for any unfair prejudice that results.216 
Thus, courts continue to inconsistently apply the concept of spoliation.217  Rule 
37 of the FRCP gives the court wide discretion in imposing sanctions.218  As 
Ahunanya Anga points out in his paper, “[v]arious circuits employ different 
standards or approaches to determine whether sanctionable conduct exists.” 219 This 
leads to inconsistent application of the rule as one looks across state or federal 
jurisdictions.220 
X. CONCLUSION 
Beginning with the Zubulake case in 2004, courts began to evaluate discovery 
issues that involve ESI.  The revised FRCP in 2006, and many state courts thereafter, 
further delineated processes for e-discovery, recognizing the distinct challenges of 
discovery in an electronic world.  Nevertheless, issues remain regarding the 
application and the scope of discovery in our advancing electronic world.   
While changes have been proposed to the FRCP,221 further changes are required 
to specifically assist in e-discovery.  This is especially important in healthcare cases, 
where there not only exists the electronic health record, but the myriad of 
information sources that are captured (and disposed of) in a rapidly changing 
environment.   
The FRCP should be amended to clarify and assist both counsel and the courts.  
Specifically: 
1. Meet and Confer – Failure to meet and confer and outline discovery requests 
should result in sanctions up to a finding of summary judgment for any party 
that does not participate.  Healthcare plaintiffs and defendants must discuss the 
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information that is and is not available, and whether any of the information is 
truly germane to the matter at hand.  In addition, parties must consider what 
information was used in any quality or peer review and thus may be protected 
from review and use. 
2. Legal hold and retention periods should begin only after action is 
commenced or upon notification by counsel that an action is being considered.  
Healthcare peer, quality, or other review must not trigger a duty to preserve 
ESI, otherwise all information would need to be preserved. 
3. Production format must be discussed at the Meet and Confer and be 
established in a written document.  Plaintiffs may request an industry standard 
format or must accept files in native format.  Metadata cannot be requested 
until review of the initial discovery requests.  There must be recognition that 
the format of ESI in a healthcare context may be limited by the product or 
system manufacturer.  Information may not be readily available or in a 
readable format with expending considerable resources. 
4. Sanctions.  Further rule promulgation should be made to define when and for 
what reasons sanctions will apply.  Severe sanctions should only be applied for 
blatant loss of information.  Good faith and good policies and procedures for 
record retention and destruction should be a buffer to sanctions. Conversely, 
healthcare providers must take reasonable steps to ensure the availability and 
integrity of the medical information within their control.   
 
Indeed as Judge Rosenthal observed, “electronic discovery is suddenly upon us,” 
including in cases involving healthcare.  We must learn to manage expectations 
relating to increasingly electronic information, to maintain reasonable, yet just, 
litigation.  Towards this end, we must clarify and focus the rules regarding discovery 
so that it does not overtake the whole of the litigation effort, and in that process loses 
sight of its purpose; a fair, just, and expedient resolution to the litigation.  The costs 
of EHRs are already significant, but the cost to use them appropriately under e-
discovery rules could be staggering. 
 
 
